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The IMF classifications of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) exchange rate arrange-
ments are heterogeneous. While one group of countries reports tight pegs to the euro, a second 
group seems to have moved toward (more) exchange rate flexibility. Based on the recent dis-
cussion about the accuracy of IMF exchange rate arrangement classifications, low- and high-
frequency exchange rate stability in Central and Eastern Europe is explored. De facto ex-
change rate stabilization is found to be much more prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe 
than suggested by de jure exchange rate classifications. Most of the CEE countries peg their 
currencies to the euro, thereby contributing to a growing euro zone. Nevertheless, as exchange 
rate stabilization against the euro is pursued with different degrees and with different long-
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1.  More Exchange Rate Flexibility in Central and Eastern Europe? 
 
The European integration has gained new momentum. In May 2004 ten mostly Central and 
Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta) have joined the European Union. Bulgaria and 
Romania are expected to follow by 2007.  
  The Eastern enlargement of the EU raises the issue of adequate exchange rate strate-
gies during the  run-up to the European Monetary Union (EMU) (Buiter and Grafe 2002, 
Corker et. al. 2000). As EU  membership implies sooner or later accession to the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism 2 (ERM2) and the EMU, exchange rate stabilization against the 
euro—as observed in Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania and Hungary—is a rational choice.  
Nevertheless, a second group of countries has (officially) moved towards more ex-
change rate flexibility. Learning from the capital market-related crisis of the second half of 
the 1990s—and following official IMF advice (Mussa et. al. 2000: 34, Fischer 2001)—the 
Czech koruna (1997), the Slovak koruna (1998) and the Polish zloty (2000) have joined the 
Slovenian tolar in the group of de jure floating currencies (Table 1). (More) flexible exchange 
rates—possibly exhibiting  wide fluctuations within the ±15% ERM2 band—will allow the 
new member states to cope better with speculative capital inflows during the EMU run-up 
(Corker et. al. 2000). 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Given the arguments in favour of both more and less exchange rate flexibility against 
the euro, the heterogeneity of the CEE exchange rate classifications as shown in Table 1 is not 
surprising. Yet, exchange rate stabilization against the euro might be de facto more prevalent 
than suggested. For instance, Reinhart and Rogoff (2002: 32) contend that “the official history 
of exchange rates can be profoundly misleading, as a striking number of pegs are much better 
described as floats, and vice-versa.”  
Furthermore, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) measure the extent of open and hidden ex-
change rate stabilization for 155 exchange rate arrangements in 39 countries and identify a 
wide range of officially flexible exchange rates as pegged (fear of floating). Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2002) argue that an increasing number of countries has abandoned explicit 
commitment to fixed exchange rate regimes, while the de facto exchange rate policies have 
remained quite stable (fear of pegging). McKinnon and Schnabl (2003) show for the post-  3 
crisis East Asian countries that exchange rates are much less flexible than suggested by IMF 
classifications.  
What about Central and Eastern Europe? Frömmel and Schobert (2003) argue that 
some CEE countries as Slovenia have adopted officially inflation targeting frameworks while 
implicitly adhering to exchange rate targeting. Given the EU (and sooner or later EMU) ac-
cession, exchange rate stabilization against the euro might be more prevalent than suggested 
by IMF classifications. 
 
2.  The Rationale for Exchange Rate Stabilization against the Euro 
 
The rationale for pegging to the euro is threefold. It springs from macroeconomic stability, 
lower transaction costs for intra-European trade and lower risk premiums for short and long-
term capital flows.  
  First, most emerging markets and development countries lack a history of macroeco-
nomic stability.  Based on underdeveloped tax systems and government-controlled central 
banks, inflation tax is a common means to finance government expenditure. Since high infla-
tion and depreciation discourage private consumption, (foreign direct) investment and interna-
tional trade, establishing credibility by macroeconomic stability is a key objective of every 
macroeconomic consolidation process. Exchange rate pegs—which help anchor both inflation 
and expectations—have been an important tool for macroeconomic stabilization, also in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe.
2  
For the CEE economies, which tried to stabilize inflation and public debt during the 
1990s with mixed success, macroeconomic convergence has been a key element of the EU 
accession process. The EC Treaty states that the economic policies are of common concern 
and are to be coordinated (art. 103). Central bank loans to the government are prohibited (art. 
104) and the member states must avoid excessive budget deficits (art. 104c). In line with this 
required macroeconomic convergence process, starting with the accession negotiations in 
1998, inflation rates dropped and the gradual depreciation of many CEE currencies abated.  
The restrictions on macroeconomic policies—and thereby the need for exchange rate 
stability against the euro
3—are even tighter after EU accession. Although the new members 
are not expected to transfer their monetary sovereignty to the EU, inflation rates have to con-
verge further towards the EMU benchmark, as the new member states are consequently be 
                                                 
2   Since 1997 in some countries inflation targeting frameworks have been implemented instead (Frömmel and 
Schobert 2003). 
3   De Grauwe and Schnabl (2003) explore the discrepancy between the Maastricht inflation and exchange rate 
criteria under the assumption of relative productivity increases (Balassa-Samuelson effect).   4 
integrated into the European System of Central Banks (ECB 2000: 46). The need for more 
exchange rate stability will be enhanced by ERM2 membership. 
 The second motivation for pegging to the euro stems from international goods markets. 
Although there has been no clear-cut evidence for a strong correlation between exchange rate 
stability and international trade (IMF 1984,  European Commission 1990), eliminating ex-
change rate uncertainty has been regarded as crucial for intra-EU trade integration. In support 
of this view De Grauwe’s (1987) gravity model for intra-EMS trade between 1973 and 1985 
finds a positive long-run correlation between less exchange rate volatility and more trade 
flows. More recently, Anderton and Skudelny (2001) have traced a statistically significant 
negative correlation between exchange rate volatility and trade among a panel of industrial 
countries. 
Extending the argument to the case of a currency union, a gravity model by Rose 
(2000) finds that irrevocably fixed exchange rates triple foreign trade. The result is recon-
firmed by Frankel and Rose (2002) who associate membership in the monetary union with 
considerable welfare gains. As Rose’s (2000) sample is mainly based on small, low income 
countries this effect might be less pronounced for larger or more developed countries (Persson 
2001). For instance, the HM Treasury (2003) argues that for the United Kingdom the addi-
tional trade with the Euro Area resulting from EMU membership would be in the range of 5% 
to 50%.  
To this end the benefits of (irrevocable) exchange rate stability against the euro for 
Central and Eastern European trade are twofold. As shown in Figure 1, in the year 2002 CEE 
exports to the EU15 were in average 58.60%. Fixed exchange rates to the euro reduce the 
transaction cost for a substantial part of CEE trade. Further, based on De Grauwe (1987) and 
Frankel and Rose (2002), the CEE countries can expect significant additional trade and wel-




[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Third, the rationale for exchange rate stabilization in emerging markets springs from underde-
veloped capital markets (“original sin”) as put forward by Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999). 
Due to a long tradition of inflation and depreciation, banks and enterprises in emerging mar-
kets and developing countries cannot use the domestic currencies to borrow abroad or to bor-
                                                 
4   De Grauwe and Schnabl (2004) show the positive impact of exchange rate stability on growth in Central and 
Eastern Europe.   5 
row long-term, even domestically. The consequence is either a currency mismatch—projects 
that generate domestic currency are financed with foreign currency—or a maturity mis-
match—long-term projects are financed with short-term loans.  
Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2001) argue that due to this dollar (euro) liabilization, 
reducing long-term exchange rate fluctuations is equivalent to reducing default risk in balance 
sheets. Indeed, the econometric estimations by Devereux and Lane (2002) find a strong nega-
tive relationship between the stock of external debt and low frequency exchange rate volatility 
relative to the creditor countries.
5 McKinnon and Schnabl (2003) explain the motivation for 
exchange rate stability at high frequencies—i.e. daily or weekly exchange rate changes. With 
incomplete capital and thereby missing forward markets, the aggregated foreign exchange risk 
of  short-term external liabilities remains unhedged by definition.
6 By stabilizing exchange 
rates on a day-to-day basis the government can provide an informal insurance for the foreign 
exchange rate risk of short-term capital flows. 
Both arguments in favor of low and high-frequency exchange rate stability apply for 
Central and Eastern Europe as—despite some recent success in creating long-term govern-
ment bond markets—capital markets remain underdeveloped (Lanoo and Salem 2001). With 
foreign bonds increasingly denominated in euro (ECB 2002: 28) the incentive to minimize 
long-term exchange rate swings against the euro is growing. The same applies for short-term 
capital flows because trade invoicing and thereby short-term payments transactions are domi-
nated by euro (ECB 2003: 33-34). Risk premiums on interest rates would shrink, thereby add-
ing additional stimulus to the real convergence process (Dornbusch 2001). 
From a future perspective the capital markets provide an additional incentive to adopt 
the euro as soon as possible. By joining the Euro Area—and having the unique chance to ir-
revocably import the reputation of the European Central Bank—the CEE economies would be 
spared the costs of building up their own capital markets.  
  
3.  Formal Tests for Exchange Rate Flexibility 
 
Based on the strong rationale for euro exchange rate stabilization in Central and Eastern 
Europe, tests for exchange rate stabilization at high and low frequencies are carried out. For 
this purpose daily and monthly data are used. As outlined by McKinnon and Schnabl (2003) 
daily (high frequency) exchange rate data reflect the efforts of monetary authorities to mini-
mize the exchange risk for short-term (capital market) transactions. Monthly data take a more 
                                                 
5   Low frequency exchange rate volatility is defined as monthly, quarterly or yearly exchange rate changes.  
6   In the highly developed capital markets of the industrial countries an investor can hedge an open position in 
foreign currency through financial derivates (forwards) at low cost.   6 
long-term perspective and capture the efforts to reduce the exchange rate risk for trade flows 
and originating from  long-term debt. The monthly frequency also allows incorporating  for-
eign reserves as additional indicators which are not available at daily or weekly frequencies.  
  At both lower and higher frequencies, exchange rate stabilization is interpreted in a 
broader sense than the hard pegs as pursued in Estonia or Lithuania. Also the attempts of 
monetary authorities to reduce exchange rate fluctuations on a daily or monthly basis—but 
allowing for more exchange rate flexibility in the medium or longer term—are regarded as a 
(less restrictive) form of exchange rate stabilization. The respective degree of exchange rate 
stabilization is measured in comparison to the euro/dollar exchange rate as the most promi-
nent fully flexible exchange rate. 
3.1.   Low-Frequency Exchange Rate Stability  
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) use three criteria to test for de facto exchange rate stabilization: 
monthly (percentage) exchange rate changes, monthly percentage changes of official foreign 
reserves, and monthly absolute changes in nominal short-term interest rates. For all three cri-
teria they set (arbitrary) probability limits to quantify the extent of exchange rate stabilization.  
First, the degree of exchange rate fluctuations indicates stabilization efforts. In general, 
within an environment of free capital movement and absence of government intervention ex-
change rates will exhibit large und persistent fluctuations. If, for instance, the probability is 
high that monthly exchange rate changes fall outside a band of ±2.5% (indicator e), the cur-
rency is rated as freely floating. With a low probability the currency is classified as fixed.  
Second, governments stabilize exchange rates by intervening in foreign exchange markets. 
To prevent the domestic currency from appreciating (depreciating), the monetary authorities 
sell (buy) domestic currency in exchange for dollars, euros or yen. The stronger the efforts to 
stabilize the exchange rate, the higher is the probability that monthly changes of official for-
eign reserves fall outside a predetermined band of ±2.5% (indicator j1).
7 
Third, monetary policy can be a tool for exchange rate stabilization. To prevent the domes-
tic currency from devaluation (appreciation) the government might increase (cut) interest 
rates. If the probability is high (low) that absolute interest rates changes fall outside a prede-
                                                 
7   Official foreign exchange reserves not only change with foreign exchange intervention, but also for other 
reasons such as government payments in foreign currency and interest receipts on foreign exchange reserves 
(Neely 2000: 22). Further, the dollar value of foreign exchange reserves is altered if the dollar exchange rate 
of third currencies changes. Nevertheless, Neely (2000) argues that there is a positive correlation between 
changes in official foreign reserves and foreign exchange intervention with sharp increases in official foreign 
currency holding indicating intervention. Furthermore, some countries might require more foreign reserve 
transactions than others to achieve the same degree of exchange rate stability. Such an effect can not be cap-
tured by the foreign reserves criterion.   7 
termined band of ±4.0% Calvo and Reinhart (2002) consider it to be an indication for (no) 
exchange rate stabilization via monetary policy (indicator i1).  
To draw a more comprehensive picture of exchange rate stabilization in Central and East-
ern Europe, the Calvo-Reinhart criteria are augmented in four regards. First, exchange vari-
ability against both the euro and the dollar is measured. Second, percent changes of foreign 
reserves—which are reported in US dollars—are measured in both dollars and euros. Third, as 
percentage changes of foreign reserves might be biased by the stock of foreign reserves,
8 an 
alternative measure for exchange rate stabilization  is added by dividing absolute changes of 
foreign reserves by the monetary base (indicator j2).
9 The (arbitrary) band width is set to 
±5.0%. 
Fourth, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) chose an arbitrary band of ±4.0% for their interest rate 
criterion i1. This bandwidth seems primarily apt to distinguish between high and low interest 
rate countries.
10 As in most CEE countries the probability that short-term interest rates change 
by more 400 basis points from one month to the other is small, the band is narrowed to ±0.4% 
(indicator i2). 
Table 2 gives an overview over the Calvo-Reinhart exchange rate criterion (e), the foreign 
reserve criteria (j1 and j2) and the interest rate criteria (i1 and i2) and their respective bands.
11 
According to Calvo and Reinhart (2002) their probability criteria are superior to the use of 
standard deviations as a measure of exchange rate volatility because they avoid distortions by 
outliers, particularly in the case of interest rates. H ere, following Hernández and Montiel 
(2001) standard deviations are applied as additional indicators. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
  The observation period starts with the introduction of the euro in January 1999 and 
reaches up to the present with two exceptions. For Poland the observation period begins in 
April 2000, when it adopted flexible exchange rates. For Lithuania the observation period 
ends in January 2002 when it shifted its dollar peg to a euro peg. The euro/dollar exchange 
                                                 
8   Given the same absolute change in foreign reserves, countries with high stock of foreign reserves exhibit low 
percentage changes while countries with low stock of foreign reserves exhibit high percentage changes. 
9   As suggested by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002). For this purpose foreign reserves have to be recon-
verted from dollars into domestic currency which comprises a bias caused by changes in the dollar exchange 
rates of the CEE currencies. 
10   For low interest rate countries the probability that the interest rate changes from one month to the other by 
more than ±4.0 percentage points is (close to) zero, independent from the exchange rate arrangement. 
11   Sensitivity tests with different bands led to by-and-large the same results.   8 
rate as well as the foreign reserves and the short-term interest rates of the free floaters Euro 
Area and the US are used as benchmarks. 
Table 3 reports the results. According to the exchange criterion e all four countries of-
ficially classified as fixed exchange rate regimes show in fact very low exchange rate volatil-
ity against the euro or the dollar. Of course, the currency boards of Bulgaria and Estonia have 
eliminated exchange rate volatility against the euro almost completely. The same applies for 
the currency board of Lithuania against the dollar up to January 2002 and against the euro 
since February 2002. The Latvian lat, which is stabilized against a SDR
12currency basket 
since 1994, exhibits low exchange rate variability against both euro (18.33%) and dollar 
(1.67%). The lower probability for the dollar is due to the higher weight of the dollar in the 
SDR based currency basket. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Hungary
13 (pegged exchange rate with horizontal band) and Romania (crawling peg) 
are presently classified as intermediate exchange rate arrangements by the IMF. Hungary 
shows rather small exchange rate variability against the euro. The probability of exceeding the 
±2.25 band against the euro is 8.33% in comparison to 37.26% of the US dollar. The Roma-
nian leu (33.33% against the euro and 31.67% against the dollar) more resembles the freely 
floating US dollar than a pegged currency.   
Out of the group of de jure free or managed floaters—the Czech Republic, Poland, the 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia—three countries seem to peg their currencies de facto to the 
euro. The Czech koruna (6.67%), the Slovenian tolar (0.00%) as well as the Slovak Koruna 
(11.67%) show a much lower probability that monthly exchange rate fluctuations exceed the 
±2.5% limit than the benchmark euro/dollar rate. Although the Slovenian tolar was allowed to 
depreciate gradually against the euro, exchange rate volatility has been considerably reduced. 
This corresponds to the notion that Slovenia had been shadowing the DM before 1999 and is 
now shadowing the euro. 
Only Poland (48.89% against the euro and 28.89% against the dollar) and Romania 
(33.33% against the euro and 31.67% against the dollar) exhibit an exchange rate volatility 
similar to the euro/dollar exchange rate (37.29%) and can be classified as free floaters accord-
                                                 
12   The SDR’s composition is 45% US dollar, 29% euro, 15% Japanese yen, 11% British pound. 
13   Hungary started shadowing the ERM2 exchange rate mechanism in 2001 with a fixed parity against the euro 
and horizontal bands of –15%. In June 2003 the parity of the forint was devalued by 2.26% to facilitate the 
way into ERM2 by higher competitiveness of Hungarian exports in the EU markets.   9 
ing to the exchange rate criterion  e. The standard deviations of monthly exchange rate 
changes support these results. 
In contrast to the exchange rate criterion e, the foreign reserves criterion j1 has to be 
interpreted more diligently as outlined above. When testing for the variability of foreign re-
serves measured in euro, for most CEE countries the probability that monthly changes of offi-
cial foreign reserves exceed ±2.5% is higher than for the US (40.68%) and the Euro Area 
(44.07%). But for Poland (30.51%) and the Czech Republic (33.90%) the probability is lower 
than for the benchmark free floaters. Romania (55.93%) is not identified as freely floating 
currency as suggested by the exchange rate criterion e. Measuring foreign reserves in US dol-
lars, yields only slightly different results.  
While the Calvo and Reinhart (2002) foreign reserves criterion j1 does not produce a 
result which is completely consistent with the exchange rate criterion e, the indicator j2 might 
provide additional information about the scope of foreign exchange intervention relative to 
the size of the monetary base. Table 3 shows the distinct difference between the large freely 
floating economies US and Euro Area and the small open economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe based on the foreign reserves criterion f 2. For the US and Euro Area the probability 
that monthly changes of foreign reserves are larger than 5.0% of the monetary base is zero. In 
contrast, for the CEE countries the probabilities range from 25.00% in the Czech Republic up 
to 71.67% in Slovenia, showing the significant size of exchange rate stabilization relative to 
the monetary base.  
Among the CEE economies the changes of foreign reserves relative to the monetary 
base are comparatively low for the Czech Republic (25.00%), for Poland (35.00%) and Ro-
mania (30.00%) which possibly indicates less active foreign exchange intervention. But also 
for Latvia the value is comparatively low (30.00%). The remaining countries range from 
40.00% (Estonia) to 71.67% (Slovenia).  
  Finally, the interest rate criteria i1 and i2 are intended to reveal exchange rate stabiliza-
tion via short-term interest rates. Absolute changes of nominal interest rates classified by a 
bandwidth of ±400 basis points (i1) draw a borderline between the high inflation country Ro-
mania and the remaining countries including the US and Euro Area. Reducing the bandwidth 
to ±40 basis points allows the identification of countries with extraordinarily sharp interest 
rate changes as Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Again the Czech Republic seems an 
outlier as the probability that i nterest rate changes are less than ±0.4% per month is less 
(6.67%) than in the US (11.67%) and equal to the Euro Area (6.67%). The Slovak Republic   10 
(10.64%) also has a similar value as the US. To this end the interest rate criterion does not 
seem to allow reliable statements about exchange rate stabilization. 
All in all, based on the low-frequency criteria as listed in Table 3 Bulgaria, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Lithuania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia are identified as pegging their exchange 
rates to the euro. Latvia pursues an intermediate strategy by pegging to both euro and dollar. 
Poland has adhered to the free float since the year 2000. The Czech koruna and the Romanian 
leu can not be clearly identified as pegged or floating currencies. While the Czech koruna 
exhibits low exchange rate variability against the euro, this exchange rate stabilization is not 
reflected in the variability of foreign reserves and interest rates. Nevertheless, due to a f ast 
rising level of Czech foreign reserves
14, there is indication of persistent exchange rate stabili-
zation. In Romania, while the volatility of foreign reserves and interest rates is high, exchange 
rate volatility has been high as well.  
3.2.  High-frequency Exchange Rate Stability  
High frequency data might provide additional evidence on the CEE exchange rate strategies. 
As shown by McKinnon and Schnabl (2003) daily exchange rate returns reflect the daily at-
tempts of central banks to smooth out exchange rate fluctuations. If the volatility of daily re-
turns is significantly smaller than for the euro/dollar rate this indicates pegging at high fre-
quencies.  
  To measure daily exchange rate volatility we use the z-score (
2 2
t t t z s m + = ) as pro-
posed by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2003) which incorporates both exchange rate fluctuations 
around a gradual depreciation path and exchange rate fluctuations around a constant level. 
The parameter µ corresponds to the arithmetic average of month-to-month percent exchange 
rate changes of the year t while s corresponds to the standard deviation of the month-to-
month percent exchange rate changes of the year t.  
  Table 4 reports the z-scores of the daily exchange rate returns against euro and dollar 
for the CEE sample. The observation period is from January 1 1999 up to March 31
 2004. The 
z-scores of daily percentage exchange rate changes are, of course, lowest for the currency 
board arrangements of Bulgaria (0.05% against the euro), E stonia (0.09% against the euro) 
and Lithuania (0.02% against the euro since February 2002).  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
                                                 
14 Foreign reserves as percent of GDP climbed from 22% in 1998 to 31% in 2003 (US 0.36% in 2003).   11 
  For the Czech koruna (0.36% against the euro), the Hungarian forint (0.40% against 
the euro), the Latvian lat (0.44% against the euro and 0.26% against the dollar), the Slovak 
koruna (0.31%), and the Slovenian tolar (0.22% against the euro) the z-scores are higher than 
the for currency board countries, but significantly smaller than for the benchmark euro/dollar 
rate (0.67%) thus indicating exchange rate stabilization against the euro. The Polish zloty and 
the Romanian leu have high standard deviations against both euro and dollar and thereby can 
be classified as freely floating currencies.
15  
 
4.  The Path towards the Euro Zone  
 
The tests for low- und high-frequency exchange rate stabilization as performed in section 3 
yield similar results. Based on the strong rationale for exchange rate stabilization against the 
euro as outlined in section 2 euro pegs are much more prevalent in Central and Eastern 
Europe than suggested by de jure exchange rate classifications. We observe a growing euro 
zone consisting of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, the Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia. Latvia pegs its currency to a currency basket which is dominated by 
the dollar (45%) and the euro (29%). Only two countries—Poland and Romania—remain 
completely outside the euro zone. 
  Figure 2 summarizes the development of euro and dollar as anchor currencies in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe starting from the beginning of the CEE transformations process in the 
early 1990s. On the y -axis a value of 100% corresponds to a complete dollar or euro zone 
respectively. The quarterly values for euro and dollar are computed as follows: Up to 1997 
pegging to currency baskets prevailed in Central and Eastern Europe. The composition of the 
currency baskets is taken from the official IMF classifications (IMF various issues) if there is 
no indication for a discrepancy between de facto and de jure exchange rate arrangements. The 
specific weights of the dollar and the aggregated weight of all European currencies are listed 
in the respective quarters of observation starting in the first quarter 1990. For instance for 
Hungary in 1990:01, a value of 0.426 (42.6%) is attributed to the dollar and a value of 0.574 
(57.4%) is attributed to the European currencies
16. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
                                                 
15   The standard deviations of the Romanian leu of 0.83% against the euro and 0.57% against the dollar might 
indicate (some) exchange rate stabilization against the dollar as argued by Frömmel and Schobert (2003). 
16   German mark, Austrian shilling, Swiss franc, Italian lira, French franc, British pound, Swedish krona, Dutch 
guilder, Finish mark and Belgian franc.   12 
If a country has adopted a unilateral peg, for instance to the euro, the maximal value of 
1 (100%) is attributed to the euro, and 0 is attributed to the dollar. If there is no information 
about exchange rate stabilization or the exchange rate is independently floating the value of 0 
is listed for both euro and dollar. Further, if there is evidence that a currency is de facto 
pegged to the euro while de jure classified as free float—as in the case of Slovenia and the 
Czech Republic after 1999—1 instead of 0 is attributed to the euro. When the exchange rate 
arrangements or the weights in the currency baskets change, the values are adjusted in the 
respective quarter. Finally, for every quarter the arithmetic middle is calculated.
17  
  Figure 2 shows the time path of pegging to the dollar and to the European currencies 
(euro since January 1999). The dotted line marks pegging to the dollar. While during the mid 
1990s the dollar had reached a considerable role as anchor currency in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the approaching EU Eastern Enlargement and the advent of the euro have triggered a 
steady decline. After the shift of the Lithuanian currency board from the dollar to the euro in 
January 2002, the dollar presently only retains a weight of 45% percent in the Latvian cur-
rency basket. When Latvia joins ERM2 this residual will also vanish. 
  The bold line represents pegging to all European currencies and since January 1999 to 
the euro. Up to 1998 several CEE countries pegged their currencies to the German mark or 
currency baskets which contained a considerable number of Western European currencies (in 
some cases ecu). Representing the sum of the respective cumulated weights Figure 2 shows 
that the weight of the European currencies grew steadily up to 1994 and then by-and-large 
remained constant between 40% and 50%. After the advent of the euro in January 1999—
despite the world wide wave of exchange rate crisis in 1997/98 and despite the shift of Poland 
to flexible rates—euro pegging has reached a record high in the new millennium.  
  With the first wave of EU accession in May 2004 the euro zone can be expected to 
grow further, approaching the 100% mark. As all new EU members will be expected to join 
ERM2 some time after accession, fully floating exchange rates as in Poland and pegs against 
anchors other than the euro as in Latvia will be incompatible with ERM2 (ECOFIN 2000). 
Romania will remain the only outsider of the CEE euro zone. 
  Furthermore, the rise of the euro zone will not be restricted to the new Central and 
Eastern European accession countries and the (still) EMU-outs Denmark, Sweden and UK. 
Given the network externalities of a large euro zone as stressed by Portes and Rey (1998) the 
countries at the periphery of the growing European Monetary Union might find it attractive to 
stabilize exchange rates against the euro. Even today reduced daily exchange rate fluctuations 
                                                 
17   A weighted average by country size (GDP) would lead to a lower level of euro pegging since 1997 as the 
large countries (Poland and Romania) have pursued flexible exchange rate arrangements.   13 
against the euro indicate that also Croatia, Morocco, Norway, Switzerland and Tunisia peg 
their currencies more or less tightly to the euro. Other countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Montenegro and Macedonia have adopted tight currency board arrangements or use the euro 
as legal tender. In Yugoslavia the euro circulates as an unofficial currency.  
  To this end, the euro zone already exceeds the scope of the present and potential EMU 
members. With the euro zone undergoing such growth, other countries at the periphery such 
as Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Algeria, Egypt or Turkey might reconsider their exchange rate 
strategies. The euro might challenge the dollar as the world currency. 
 
5.  Outlook   
 
Based on a variety of tests for de facto low and high-frequency exchange rate stabilization, 
this paper has shown that Central and Eastern European exchange rate stabilization against the 
euro is much more prevalent than suggested by IMF classifications. Based on a strong ration-
ale for euro stabilization, the euro zone in and around Europe is growing steadily.  
  This finding leaves us with one caveat, however. The tests performed in section 3 were 
based on a relatively wide concept of exchange rate stabilization. It comprises rigid currency 
boards (Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania), a pegged rate with wide horizontal bands (Hun-
gary), a downward crawling peg (Slovenia), a currency basket with 29% euro weight (Latvia) 
and more discretionary exchange rate stabilization with appreciation drift as observed in the 
Czech Republic. The exchange strategies in Central and Eastern Europe are still far from be-
ing unified. 
  Also ERM2 membership is unlikely to make the CEE exchange rate strategies com-
pletely homogenous, as the relative wide ERM2 band will allow for a broad variety of stabili-
zation strategies (De Grauwe and Schnabl 2003). In particular Poland—the by far largest CEE 
economy—might continue to pursue a comparatively flexible exchange rate strategy. This 
implies a considerable degree of intra-regional exchange rate fluctuations which can be asso-
ciated with  higher costs for intra-regional trade and  a higher degree of macroeconomic 
instability.  
  This leaves us with the question of a more homogenous exchange rate strategy in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe. As observed by McKinnon and Schnabl (2003) for East Asia the 
common peg to dollar fostered intra-regional trade and macroeconomic stability. The intra-
regional CEE trade integration is still rather weak. A further unification of the CEE exchange 
rate strategies could contribute to more intra-regional trade integration and macroeconomic 
stability thus adding an additional growth stimulus for the whole region.    14 
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Table 1: Exchange Rate Arrangements in Central and Eastern Europe 
  90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  00  01  02  03 
Bulgaria  3  8  8  8  8  8  8  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Czech Rep.  3  3  3  3  3  3  6  7  7  7  7  8  8  8 
Estonia  n.a.  n.a.  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Hungary  3  3  3  3  3  6  6  6  6  6  6  4  4  4 
Latvia  n.a.  n.a.  8  8  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
Lithuania  n.a.  n.a.  8  8  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Poland  3  5  5  5  5  6  6  6  6  6  8  8  8  8 
Romania  3  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  6  6  6 
Slovak Rep.  3  3  3  3  3  3  6  6  7  7  7  7  7  7 
Slovenia  n.a.  n.a.  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7 
Source: IMF (various issues).  
1: exchange rate arrangements with no separate legal tender 
2: currency board arrangements 
3: other conventional fixed peg arrangements (within a band of most ±1%) 
4: pegged exchange rate arrangements within horizontal bands (at least ±1%) 
5: crawling pegs (with small, pre-announced adjustment) 
6: exchange rates with crawling bands  
7: managed floating with no pre-announced path for the exchange rate 
8: independent floating (market-determined exchange rate and independent monetary policy)  
 
 
Table 2: Indicators for Exchange Rate Stability 


























j   t t i i - = +1 1 i
 
t t i i - = +1 2 i
 
Band  ±2.5%  ±2.5%  ±5.0%  ±4.0%  ±0.4% 
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Table 3: Indicators for Exchange Rate Stabilization as Outlined in Table 2  (1999:01–2003:12) 





serves j1 (€) 
Foreign Re-




  Rate i1 
Interest 
  Rate i2 
  P  s  P  s  P  s  P    P  s  P  s  P  s 
Bulgaria  0.00%  0.00%  33.33%  2.62%  55.93%  4.71%  63.33%  5.01%  61.67%  9.33%  3.33%  1.34%  63.33%  1.34% 
Czech Republic  6.67%  1.54%  40.00%  3.09%  33.90%  3.84%  35.00%  4.40%  25.00%  9.08%  0.00%  0.25%  6.67%  0.25% 
Estonia  0.00%  0.00%  31.67%  2.59%  74.58%  7.90%  61.67%  8.43%  40.00%  9.38%  5.00%  1.51%  18.33%  1.51% 
Hungary  8.33%  1.54%  31.67%  2.63%  69.49%  7.59%  63.33%  7.74%  61.67%  11.87%  0.00%  0.62%  28.81%  0.62% 
Latvia  18.33%  1.90%  1.67%  1.25%  62.71%  6.32%  61.67%  5.86%  30.00%  5.70%  0.00%  1.09%  60.00%  1.09% 
Lithuania*  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  67.80%  7.08%  65.00%  7.15%  56.67%  10.81%  0.00%  1.43%  68.33%  1.43% 
Poland
%  48.89%  2.52%  28.89%  2.60%  30.51%  2.54%  31.11%  2.78%  35.00%  5.59%  1.83%  1.36%  51.85%  1.36% 
Romania  33.33%  2.52%  31.67%  2.62%  55.93%  6.26%  53.33%  6.10%  30.00%  7.50%  24.53%  7.30%  90.57%  7.30% 





Slovenia  0.00%  0.55%  40.00%  2.68%  55.93%  5.14%  55.00%  4.74%  71.67%  19.75%  0.00%  0.62%  38.33%  0.62% 
US ($/€)  37.29%  2.64%      40.68%  3.03%  31.67%  2.95%  0.00%  0.17%  0.00%  0.21%  11.67%  0.21% 
Euro Area (€/$)      37.29%  2.64%  44.07%  2.84%  11.86%  1.58%  0.00%  0.39%  0.00%  0.18%  6.67%  0.18% 
Source: IMF: IFS. P marks the probability that the respective criterion falls outside the predetermined band. s marks the standard deviation of the 
respective indicator. * As Lithuania changed the nominal anchor from the dollar to the euro in February 2002, the observation period for exchange 
rate stability against the dollar is from 1999:01 to 2002:01 and for exchange rate stability against the euro from 2002:02 up to 2003:12. 
% starting in 
April 2000 with the official floating of the Polish zloty. 
 # starting in January 2000 when data became available. Interest rates are money market inter-
est rates except for Hungary and Romania where treasury bill rates were used.   19 
 
Table 4: Daily Exchange Rate Volatilities against Euro and Dollar 
01/01/99 – 03/31/04  Euro  Dollar 
Bulgarian lev  0.05%  0.62% 
Czech koruna  0.36%  0.68% 
Estonian kroon  0.09%  0.64% 
Hungarian forint  0.40%  0.69% 
Latvian lat  0.44%  0.26% 
Lithuanian lita*  [0.66%] (0.02%)  [0.02%] (0.61%) 
Polish zloty  0.67%  0.63% 
Romanian leu  0.82%  0.58% 
Slovak koruna  0.31%  0.72% 
Slovenian tolar  0.22%  0.65% 
euro/dollar  0.67%  0.67% 
Source: Datastream. Volatility defined as standard deviations (s) and 
arithmetic averages (µ) of daily exchange rate returns (
2 2
t t s m + ). * 
Note two sub-samples for Lithuania due to the shift in exchange rate 
regime: [01/01/99 – 01/30/02] (02/01/02 – 03/31/04) 
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Source: IMF: Direction of Trade Statistics  
 
 



























































Source: IMF (several issues) and own calculations (arithmetic averages). 
  